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       Abstract 
 
 This paper reports on a system for automated agent 
negotiation. It uses the JADE agent framework, and its 
major distinctive feature is the use of declarative 
negotiation strategies. The negotiation strategies are 
expressed in a declarative rules language, defeasible 
logic and are applied using the implemented defeasible 
reasoning system DR-DEVICE. The choice of defeasible 
logic is justified. The overall system architecture is 
described, and a particular negotiation case is presented 




In the last few years, there has been a great interest in 
electronic commerce potential. As the number of 
transactions carried out through the Internet increases, the 
interest for partial or full automation of these transactions 
increases as well [1]. This automation is achieved by the 
use of software agents’ technology. One basic stage of e-
commerce procedure that can be automated is the 
negotiation stage [2].  
The focus of our work is on the automated negotiation 
aspect of e-commerce. As stated in [17], automated 
negotiation is the process by which two or more agents 
communicate and try to come to a mutually acceptable 
agreement on some matter. The basic dimensions of 
automated negotiation are negotiation protocols and 
negotiation strategies. Negotiation protocol is a set of 
rules which govern the interaction and a negotiation 
strategy is a decision making model, which participants 
employ in order to achieve their goal in line with the 
negotiation protocol.  
As far as negotiation strategies are concerned, there 
are three possible approaches to design them according to 
[17]: Game theoretic, which model negotiation as a game, 
heuristic which employ a set of tactics and some rules for 
selecting a tactic, and argumentation-based which 
introduce performatives such as threats, promises etc. We 
take the heuristic approach and propose to use defeasible 
logic, a declarative language based on rules and priorities, 
as a formal framework to model protocols and strategies 
for automated negotiation; this is the major distinctive 
feature of our implemented system. Our work builds upon 
the previous theoretic work of [8]. 
At this point we must justify the choice of defeasible 
logic among various schemes for representing strategies 
and protocols. Firstly it is formal, that is, its semantics and 
syntax are properly defined. It is also conceptual meaning 
that it offers a good level of abstraction. So, anyone can 
focus only on protocol or strategy design, being 
indifferent to the implementation. Defeasible logic is also 
comprehensible and expressive as well. The latter is very 
important because enables us to describe a wide range of 
protocols and strategies.  Lastly it is executable. 
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows. 
Section 2 provides a short discussion of the use of 
defeasible logics. Section 3 presents the system 
architecture, while sections 4-6 illustrate the functionality 
and use of the system based on a concrete case. Finally, 
conclusions and planned future work are described in 
section 7. 
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2. Choice of Formalism 
 
2.1. On Defeasible Logics 
 
Defeasible reasoning is a simple rule-based approach 
to reasoning with incomplete and inconsistent 
information. It can represent facts, rules, and priorities 
among rules. This reasoning family comprises defeasible 
logics [13, 15] and Courteous Logic Programs [14], and 
has the following characteristics: (a) They are rule-based, 
without disjunction (b) Classical negation is used in the 
heads and bodies of rules, but negation-as-failure is not 
necessarily used in the object language (it can easily be 
simulated, if necessary [16]) (c) Rules may support 
conflicting conclusions (d) The logics are sceptical in the 
sense that conflicting rules do not fire. Thus consistency 
is preserved (e) Priorities on rules may be used to resolve 
some conflicts among rules (f) The logics take a 
pragmatic view and have low computational complexity. 
Generally speaking, defeasible logics have two kinds of 
rules: strict rules which behave like standard, classical 
rules (once their premises are satisfied they fire) and 
defeasible rules, which may not fire even when their 
premises are satisfied, because they are blocked by other 
rules. More complex logics have a further kind of rules, 
so-called defeaters.  
 
2.2. Why Defeasible Logics for Negotiation 
Strategies 
 
Applying a negotiation strategy in a particular context 
is an intensive decision-making process. While most 
aspects of negotiation strategies could be fully captured in 
classical logic programming (which has a formal 
semantics and has proven to be a powerful tool for 
building decision-making systems), this would put a 
burden on the developers of strategies, since logic 
programming is a generic paradigm and offers nothing 
specific to strategy specification (such as argumentation, 
defeasibility, hypothetical reasoning, preferences, etc.). 
Accordingly, we propose to use a logic programming 
language based on non-monotonic reasoning. Among the 
many members of the family of non-monotonic logics, we 
choose defeasible logic [15] for the following reasons: (a) 
A negotiation can be thought of as a dialogue between 
parties concerning the resolution of a dispute. This 
suggests that argumentation based reasoning formalisms 
are suitable to characterise it.  In [18], it was shown that 
defeasible logic can be characterised by an argumentation 
semantics, thus the formal semantics of defeasible logic is 
in line with the argumentative nature of negotiations. (b) 
Given the close connection between derivations in 
Defeasible Logic and arguments, strategies expressed in 
Defeasible Logic are explainable. (c) Defeasible logic is a 
sceptical formalism, meaning that it does not support 
contradictory conclusions. Instead it seeks to resolve 
conflicts. In cases where there is some support for 
concluding A but also support for concluding ¬A, the 
logic does not conclude either of them (thus the name 
“sceptical”).  If the support for A has priority over the 
support for ¬A then A would be concluded. We believe 
that non-sceptical reasoning is inappropriate for 
modelling decision-making processes such as 
negotiations, since it is quite useless to deduce both that a 
decision should be taken, and that it should not be taken. 
(d) Defeasible logic integrates the concept of priorities 
between rules, thereby supporting a direct way of 
modelling preferences, without having to attach a metric 
to them, as it is the case of approaches based on utility 
functions [19]. (e) Regarding strategy specification, most 
of the current systems adopt a quantitative approach based 
on utility functions. Very often, it is not easy to find the 
right utility functions for a given set of negotiation issues, 
especially in situations where one needs to express 
preferences without attaching a metric to them. Moreover, 
utility functions are mostly used to determine preferences 
that can otherwise be expressed in a more comprehensible 
and suitable way through defeasible rules and priorities 
among these rules. For this reason, we believe that 
defeasible logic is more suitable than, or at least 
complementary to, strategy specification approaches 
purely based on utility functions. (f) Defeasible logic has 
a linear complexity, and existing implementations are able 
to deal with non trivial theories consisting of over 
100,000 rules [20], offering thus an executable and 
scalable system. 
 
3. Implemented Agent Architecture 
 
The Agent Framework we used was JADE [3, 6, 7]. 
JADE is an open-source middleware for the development 
of distributed multi-agent applications based on the peer-
to-peer communication architecture. JADE is java-based 
and compliant with the FIPA specification. It provides 
libraries for agent communication and interaction, based 
on FIPA standards. It also provides tools for agent 
lifecycle management, inspection of exchanged messages 
and debugging.  
The Agent Architecture we implemented was 
primarily based on the architecture proposed by Dumas et 
al. [8]. Software agents consists of four components: (a) A 
memory which contains past decisions and interactions 
(Knowledge Base), (b) A communication module which 
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handles incoming and outcoming messages (JADE 
platform), (c) A reasoning module (DR-DEVICE 
Inference Engine) (d) A control module for the 
coordination of the above components (script in Java).  
For the reasoning module of the agent we used DR-
DEVICE [11]. DR-DEVICE is a defeasible reasoning 
system. Its user interface is compatible with RuleML, the 
main standardization effort for rules on the semantic web 
and is based on a CLIPS-based implementation of 
deductive rules. 
The architecture of the negotiating agent is depicted in 
Fig.1. When the agent is notified of an external event, 
such as an incoming message (step 1), the control module 
initially retrieves a fact template from the local storage 
unit (step 2) and consequently, the negotiation parameters 
from the memory (step 3). The template is an empty 
placeholder in line with DR-DEVICE system syntax. 
When the template is filled with the negotiation 
parameters, is then regarded as “the facts”. The control 
module updates the knowledge base with the new facts 
(step 4) and then activates DR-DEVICE (step 5). DR-
DEVICE in turn retrieves from the knowledge base the 
facts, along with the strategy (step 6) and starts the 
inferencing process. After the inferencing has been 
completed, the knowledge base is updated with the results 
(step 7). The control module queries the knowledge base 
for the result (step 8) and after a short processing; an 
appropriate message is posted to the communication 
module. 
 
4. The Negotiation Protocol: An Example 
 
As we have already stressed, a basic condition for the 
automation of the negotiation process among intelligent 
agents, is the existence of a negotiation protocol, which 
encodes the allowed sequences of actions, or in other 
words the rules of the game. Our first thought was to use a 
well-defined protocol for 1-1 automated negotiation. 
Although FIPA provides a plethora of standardized 
protocols we found that there is no standard interaction 
protocol, when it comes to 1-1 automated negotiation. As 
a result, we implemented a negotiation protocol proposed 
in [9]. This protocol is a finite state machine that must be 
hard-coded to all agents, participating into the negotiation. 
The protocol is depicted in Fig. 2. S0 to S6 represent the 
states of a negotiation and E is the final state in which 
there is an agreement, or a failure of agreement between 
the participants. Send and Recv predicates represent the 
interactions which cause state transitions. To clarify the 
function of the protocol we give an example. If the 
sequence of transitions is the following: S0Æ 
S1ÆS2ÆS6ÆE, that means that the agent initially sends 
a call for proposal message (CFP) to the other negotiating 
agent (S0Æ S1), then he receives a propose message 
(S1ÆS2) and after the evaluation he decides to send an 
accept message (S2ÆS6). 
 
Fig.1. Architecture of Defeasible Logic-Based   
Negotiating Agent 
 
Lastly he receives an accept message and the 
negotiation terminates successfully (S6ÆE). We make the 
convention that the participant that plays the role of the 
buyer starts the negotiation by posting a CFP message. 
So, while the protocol can be used as it is by a buyer, it 
needs a small modification for a seller. Particularly 
instead of the transition S0Æ S1 there should be a 
transition S0Æ S2 with label “Recv CFP”. 
 
5. The Negotiation Strategy: An Example 
Every strategy is indeed designed in line with a 
particular protocol. We based the strategies we used on 
the work of Tsang et al. [10]. They define the simple 
constrained bargaining game between one buyer and one 
seller. One of the most important assumptions are that the 
seller is constraint by the cost and the number of days 
within which he has to sell, while the buyer is constrained 
by his utility and the number of days within which he has 
to buy. In addition, neither the buyer nor the seller has 
information about the constraints of the other. The players 
make alternative bids with the seller to bid first and they 
can bid only once per day. An agreement is reached when 
both buyer and seller bid for the same price. Finally, 
according to the assumptions, if a deal cannot be made 
before a player runs out of time the negotiation 
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terminates. The characteristics of the strategy are 
described in Table 1. 
 
Fig.2. 1-1 Negotiation Protocol 
We have made the following changes for the strategy 
of the buyer: Firstly, buyer and seller are not obliged to 
make only one offer per day but one offer per negotiation 
step. Negotiation step is handled by the protocol and 
increases each time a player (buyer or seller) has made an 
offer and subsequently has received a counteroffer or 
another message. So, we speak about time to buy (TTB) 
and time to sell (TTS), measured in negotiation steps. 
Secondly, except for the offer-acceptance criterion we 
have added a check during the offer submission to avoid 
results which are against the benefit of the player. Thirdly, 
we incorporated into the strategy parameters relevant to 
the protocol like the state of the negotiation and the step 
of the negotiation. Lastly, an agreement is reached when 
both buyer and seller send an “Accept Proposal” message. 
For the buyer, participating into the negotiation, we 
used the modified strategy of Tsang et al. and we 
expressed it in defeasible logic. For the seller we used a 
strategy hard-coded in java to demonstrate that agents 
with different architecture can interact without any 
problems. Seller’s strategy is quite similar with that of 
buyer, except for the general bidding strategy. Seller 
decreases his offer by a fixed amount while buyer 
increases his offer in a linear fashion.  
  
Table1. Buyer’s Strategy Characteristics 
 
We express the buyer’s strategy in defeasible logic 
(see Fig.3). The predicates we use are the following: (a) 
Step(s): The step of the negotiation. When a buyer or 
seller sends a message and then receives another one the 
step is increased by one (b) Counteroffer(c): The offer 
which a buyer or seller receives from the opponent (c) 
Min_profit(mp): The minimum profit the buyer seeks 
after buying the product (d) Utility(u): The utility of the 
buyer if he buys the product (e) Ttb(ttb):  The time 
(negotiation steps) the buyer has at his disposal in order to 
buy the product (f) State(st): The current state of the 
negotiation according to the protocol. The possible states 
are: 1(S1) (The buyer has already sent a CFP or a 
PROPOSE message), 2(S2) (The buyer has already 
received a PROPOSE message), 3(S3) (The buyer has 
already received a REJECT message) etc. (g) 
First_bid(fb): The initial bid of the buyer  (h) 
Previous_bid(prb): The previous bid of the buyer. 
   
Fig.3. Buyer’s Strategy in Defeasible Logic 
 
Rules R1, R2, and R3 define the conditions for the 
acceptance or rejection of a proposal. More specific Rule 
R1 states that if the current state of the negotiation is S2 
(agent has received a “propose” message) and if 
opponent’s offer plus the minimum profit is less or equal 
to half the utility, the counteroffer is accepted in all cases. 
R2 describes the case in which opponent’s offer plus the 
minimum profit is greater than his utility and the 























R1:State(st),Counteroffer(c),Min_profit(mp),Utility(u),st=2,     
c+mp ≤ u/2 ⇒   ACCEPT_PROPOSAL 
R2:State(st),Counteroffer(c),Min_profit(mp),Utility(u),st=2,  
c+mp > u ⇒   ~ACCEPT_PROPOSAL 
R3: State(st), st=5 ⇒   ACCEPT_PROPOSAL 
R4:Step(s),State(st),Counteroffer(c),Min_profit(mp),Utility(u), 
First_Bid(fb),s=0,st=2, u/2<c+mp≤u,bid=fb ⇒PROPOSE(bid) 
R5:Step(s),Ttb(ttb),State(st),Counteroffer(c),Min_profit(mp), 
Utility(u),First_bid(fb),Previous_bid(prb),0<s≤ttb-1,st=2,u/2< 
c+mp ≤ u, prb=0, bid=fb ⇒   PROPOSE(bid) 
R6:Step(s),Ttb(ttb),State(st),Counteroffer(c),Min_profit(mp), 
Utility(u),Previous_bid(prb),0<s<ttb-1,st=2,u/2<c+mp≤u,prb!=0, 
bid=(u-prb)/2+prb ⇒   PRELIM_PROPOSE(bid) 
R7:Step(s),Ttb(ttb),State(st),Previous_bid(prb),Utility(u),   
0<s<ttb-1,st=3,bid=(u-prb)/2+prb⇒  PRELIM_PROPOSE(bid)  
R8: PRELIM_PROPOSE(bid) ⇒   PROPOSE(bid) 
R9:Min_profit(mp),Utility(u),PRELIM_PROPOSE(bid),bid>u- 
mp ⇒    ~PROPOSE(bid) 
R10:Min_profit(mp),Utility(u),PRELIM_PROPOSE(bid),bid>u-
mp,new_bid=utility-min_profit⇒   PROPOSE(new_bid)                 
      
                                               R9>R8 
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current state of the negotiation is S5 (agent has received 
an “accept” message) he also sends an “accept” message.     
There are two levels for the bidding policy. Bidding of 
first step and general bidding policy. R4 states that if the 
negotiation is at the first step and the counteroffer is 
generous (u/2<c+mp≤u), the first bid is offered. 
According to R5 if the current state of the negotiation is 
S2 (Agent has received a “propose” message) but it has 
not made one, it offers the first bid (the utility divided by 
the ttb). Contrary to rule R4 which fires only at step 0, R5 
fires at any step of negotiation. R6 defines that if the 
current state of the negotiation is S2 (agent has received a 
“propose” message) and it has made an offer in the 
previous step, it increases linearly its offer. R7 describes 
that if the current state of the negotiation is S3 (agent has 
received a “reject” message) it also offers the above bid. 
R8 defines that if R7 or R6 is true then the computed 
amount for the bid is to be offered. However, R9 checks if 
the bid to be offered is lower than the utility minus the 
minimum profit and if it is not, R10 is fired. Rule R9 is an 
additional check that ensures that the offered amount of 
money for the product is not against the benefit of the 
buyer.  
 
6. Negotiation Trace 
 
At this section we demonstrate the operation of the 
system and we examine a negotiation trace between a 
buyer agent and a seller agent. We examine the trace from 
the point of view of the buyer. The parameters of the 
negotiation are the following. Buyer: (TTB = 5, Minimum 
Profit = 100, Utility = 1000) Seller (TTS = 10, Minimum 
Profit = 100, Maximum Profit = 800, Bid decrement = 40, 
Cost  = 200). 
Buyer initially issues a “call for proposal” message 
(CFP) and seller responds with a “propose”. The amount 
proposed by the seller is 1000. According to the condition 
of R2 of buyer’s strategy, as long as the relation c+mp > u 
is true, the buyer keeps rejecting the offer. As the buyer 
has rejected seller’s offer, at the next step of the 
negotiation, seller decreases its offered amount by 40 (bid 
decrement) and waits for the response of the buyer. As 
buyer regards (according to his strategy) that the amount 
of 960 is too high, continues to reject the offer, without 
issuing a counteroffer. At this point we must say that 
although the protocol allows both for a counteroffer or a 
rejection of a proposal, the decision lies to the agent and 
is expressed through the strategy. Seller decreases his 
offer by another 40, offering 920. Buyer still rejects 
seller’s offer and the latter subsequently offers 880. As 
the relation 880+100>1000 (c+mp>u) is now false, R5 
fires and the buyer offers his initial offer which is the 
amount 1000/5 (u/TTB). At the next step, seller offers 840 
and waits the buyer for its response. R6 now fires and 
buyer offers the amount 600. Seller in turn issues an 
accept message and the negotiation terminates. At this 
point we must notice that if seller’s last message was not 
“accept-proposal”, buyer’s control module would issue a 
“cancel” as the ttb would exceed 5.  
Now let’s analyze the structure of exchanged 
messages. FIPA ACL messages [4] are built up of three 
layers of languages [12]. a) Elements of the world are 
defined in an ontology. b) An agent’s intention to describe 
or alter the world is expressed by a communicative act or 
speech-act such as INFORM and c) statements about the 
world are expressed by means of a Content Language.  In 
order for agents to be able to reason about the effects of 
their communication, ACL messages should be inserted 
into proper Agent Interaction Protocol [5] which describes 
allowed sequences of actions among agents. 
The traces were taken with the help of sniffer agent, 
provided by JADE platform. At the left-hand side of Fig. 
4 one can see all the interactions among the buyer and the 
seller agent, we analyze the interaction which is indicated 
by the arrow 12 directed from the seller to buyer. The 
ACL which corresponds to interaction 12 of Fig. 4 is 
indicated by arrow no.1. The communicative act (or 
speech-act) of this ACL message is “accept-proposal”. 
The ontology, which both buyer and seller share, is called 
“Negotiation” and the used interaction protocol is called 
“Simple-Bargaining”. The used content language was 
FIPA SL0 and the content of the message is indicated by 
arrow no.2. The negotiation is about a black NOKIA 1100 
mobile phone, which finally seller accepts to sell to buyer 
for 600 money units. 
 
7. Conclusions and Future Work 
 
In this paper we described the design and 
implementation of a system for automated agent 
negotiation, based on declarative strategies for the 
expression of negotiation strategies. Such negotiations can 
be expected to play a key role on the semantic web. 
Planned future work includes: (a) Designing graphical 
user interfaces, (b) Applying our system in electronic 
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 ((action  
     (agent-identifier  
       :name SELLER@anemos:1099/JADE  
       :addresses  
         (sequence 
IOR:000000000000001149444C3A464950412F
4D54533A312E…))  
     (SUGGEST  
       :SUGGEST_qty (QUANTITY  
           :QUANTITY_value "1")  
       :SUGGEST_prc (PRICE  
           :PRICE_value "600")  
       :SUGGEST_item  
         (ITEM  
           :ITEM name "Nokia 1100"  
1 
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